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Glossary
Counterfactual Emotions Counterfactual arguments involve reasoning which makes assumptions contrary to the facts in
evidence (e.g., “If I were King, I’d make everyone rich”). Counterfactual emotions are feeling states, such as regret and
disappointment, which require a comparison between some state of affairs and what might have been.
Gambler’s Fallacy The idea that prior outcomes, such as a string of “red” numbers in roulette, can influence the outcome of
some future outcome, such as a “black” number; it is a fallacy because, in a truly random game, each outcome is independent
of the others.
Dichotic Listening A technique in which different auditory messages are presented over separate earphones; the subject is
instructed to repeat (shadow) one message but ignore the other.
Dissociation A statistical outcome in which one variable, either a subject characteristic (such as the presence of brain damage)
or an experimental manipulation (such as the direction of attention), has different effects on two dependent measures (such as
free recall or priming).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) A brain-imaging technique using magnets to measure the changes in the
ratios of deoxygenated to oxygenated hemoglobin due to neuronal activity.
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) A brain-imaging technique using Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices
(SQUIDs) to measure changes in weak magnetic fields caused by the brain’s electrical activity.
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) A brain-imaging technique which uses positrons (positively charged electrons) to
measure blood flow, metabolic rate, and biochemical changes in the brain.
Priming The facilitation (or, in the negative case, inhibition) of perceptual-cognitive processing of a target stimulus by prior
presentation of a priming stimulus.
Schemata Organized knowledge structures representing a person’s beliefs and expectations, permitting the person to make
inferences and predictions.
Sensory Thresholds In psychophysics, the minimum amount of energy required for an observer to detect the presence of
a stimulus (the “absolute” threshold) or a change in a stimulus (the “relative” threshold).
Tabula Rasa From the Latin, “blank slate”; refers to the empiricist view that there are no innate ideas, and that all knowledge is
gained through experience.
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Definition
Cognition has to do with knowledge, and cognitive psychology seeks to understand how human beings acquire knowledge about
themselves and the world, how this knowledge is represented in the mind and brain, and how they use this knowledge to guide
behavior.
A Short History of Cognition in Psychology
Psychology was cognitive at its origins in the mid to late 19th century. Structuralists like Wilhelm Wundt and E.B. Titchener
attempted to decompose conscious experience into its constituent sensations, images, and feelings. On the very first page of
the Principles of Psychology (1890), the discipline’s founding text, William James asserted that “the first fact for us, then, as psychol-
ogists, is that thinking of some sort goes on”, and the functionalist tradition that he and John Dewey established sought to under-
stand the role of thinking and other aspects of mental life in our adaptation to the environment. In the early 20th century,
however, John B. Watson attempted to remake psychology as a science of behavior rather than, as James had defined it, a science
of mental life.
For Watson, public observation was the key to making psychology a viable, progressive science. Because consciousness (not to
mention “the unconscious”) was essentially private, Watson argued that psychology should abandon any interest in mental life, and
instead confine its interest to what could be publicly observed: behavior and the circumstances under which it occurred. In Watson’s
view, thoughts and other mental states did not cause behavior; rather, behavior was elicited by environmental stimuli. Thus began
the behaviorist program, pursued most famously by B.F. Skinner, of tracing the relations between environmental events and the
organism’s response to them. Psychology, in the words of Robert S. Woodworth, lost its mind.
The behaviorist program dominated psychology between the two world wars and well into the 1950s, as manifested especially
by the field’s focus on learning in nonhuman animals such as rats and pigeons. Gradually, however, psychologists came to realize
that they could not understand behavior solely in terms of the correlation between stimulus inputs and response outputs. E.C.
Tolman discovered that rats learned in the absence of reinforcement, while Harry Harlow discovered that monkeys acquired
general “sets” through learning, as well as specific responses. Noam Chomsky famously showed that Skinner’s version of behav-
iorism could not account for language learning or performance, completely reinventing the discipline of linguistics in the process,
and George Miller brought Chomsky’s insights to psychology. Leon Kamin, Robert Rescorla, and others demonstrated that condi-
tioned responses, even in rats, rabbits, and dogs, were mediated by expectations of predictability and controllability rather than
associations based on spatiotemporal contiguity. These and other findings convinced psychologists that they could not under-
stand the behavior of organisms without understanding the internal cognitive structures that mediated between stimulus and
response.
The “cognitive revolution” in psychology, which was really more of a counterrevolution against the revolution of behaviorism,
was stimulated by the introduction of the high-speed computer. With input devices analogous to sensory and perceptual mecha-
nisms, memory structures for storing information, control processes for passing information among them, transforming it along
the way, and output devices analogous to behavior, the computer provided a tangible model for human thought. Perceiving,
learning, remembering, and thinking were reconstrued in terms of “human information processing”, performed by the software
of the mind on the hardware of the brain. Artificial intelligence, simulated by the computer, became both a model and a challenge
for human intelligence.
Jerome Bruner and George Miller founded the Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard University in 1960, intending to bring the
insights of information theory and the Chomskian approach to language to bear on psychology. Miller’s book, Plans and the Struc-
ture of Behavior (1960, written with Karl Pribram and Eugene Galanter) replaced the reflex arc of behaviorism with the feedback
loops of cybernetics. The cognitive (counter)revolution was consolidated by the publication of Neisser’s Cognitive Psychology in
1967, and the founding of a scientific journal by the same name in 1970. With the availability of a comprehensive textbook on
which undergraduate courses could be based, psychology regained its mind.
The Domain of Cognition
Cognition has to do with knowledge. Although some philosophers (including Plato, Descartes, and Kant) have asserted that some
knowledge is innate, most also agree that at least some knowledge is acquired through experience. Accordingly, the goal of cognitive
psychology is to provide an account of the sensory and perceptual processes by which the individual person forms internal, mental
representations of the external world, the learning processes by which the person acquires knowledge through experience, the means
by which these representations of knowledge and experience are stored more or less permanently in memory, the manner in which
knowledge is used in the course of judgment, decision making, reasoning, problem solving, and other manifestations of human
intelligence, and how one’s thoughts and other mental states are communicated to others through language.
We cannot hope to give a comprehensive analysis of these processes in this small space. Detailed treatment is provided by other
Reference Modules, and the textbooks listed in the bibliography. In this article, we seek only to orient the reader to the to the general
thrust of work in this field, and to the problems and controversies which occupy its practitioners.
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Sensation
Philosophers of mind have debated two views about the origins of knowledge: nativism and empiricism. Cognitive psychology,
while acknowledging the possibility that some knowledge is innate, favors the empiricist view that most knowledge is acquired
through the senses, including our reflections on sensory experience. Therefore, cognitive psychology begins with an analysis of
the sensory mechanisms by physical energies arising from a stimulus are transformed into neural impulses.
Research on sensation is dominated by the definition of the various sensory modalities (vision, audition, etc.), the determina-
tion of thresholds for sensory experience, the physical basis of various qualities of sensation (e.g., blue, C-sharp, and sour), and the
search for psychophysical laws that would relate the physical properties of a stimulus to the psychological properties of the corre-
sponding sensory experience. The most general psychophysical law, Stevens’ Law (S¼ kIn), holds that there is some exponent which
will relate any physical property of a stimulus to the psychological property of its corresponding sensory experience. The analysis of
sensation is so closely tied to the physical and biological sciences that it is often left out of cognitive psychology textbooks alto-
gether. However, even such “lower” mental processes as sensation and perception do not escape the influence of “higher” mental
processes of judgment and decision making.
For example, the early psychophysicists assumed that the detection of an object in the environment was simply a matter of the
physical intensity of the stimulus, and the sensitivity of the corresponding receptor organs. If a light were of sufficient intensity,
given the modality and species in question, it would be detected (a “hit”); otherwise, it would be missed. However, it is also the
case that observers will miss stimuli that are clearly above threshold, and commit “false alarms” by “detecting” stimuli that are
not actually present. Experiments based on signal detection theory use the pattern of hits and false alarms to decompose performance
into two parameters: sensitivity (often indexed by a statistic known as d’), presumably closely tied to the biology of the sensory
system, and bias (often indexed by a statistic known as b), or the perceiver’s willingness to report the presence of a stimulus under
conditions of uncertainty. Interest in most signal detection experiments focuses on sensitivity; bias is generally considered to be
a nuisance to be evaluated and statistically controlled. But the fact that bias occurs at all shows that the perceiver’s expectations,
motives, and biases influence performance even in the simplest sensory task. Thus, processes involved in reasoning, judgment,
and choice, and decision percolate down even to the lowest levels of the information-processing system, and they are grist for
the cognitive psychologist’s mill.
Signal-detection estimates of sensitivity are independent of bias, but the reverse is not the case: shifts in criterion can lead to
changes in sensitivity as well. For example, if subjects are cautioned to say “yes” only when they are certain that the stimulus is
present, they will generally yield lower estimates of d’ than when they are encouraged to guess. Findings such as this suggest
that the sensory system is not unitary; instead, there may be more than one sensory system, each with a different sensitivity to stim-
ulation, and each tapped by a different method of testing.
Perception
While sensation has to do with detecting the presence of stimuli, and changes in the stimulus field, perception has to do with form-
ing mental representations of the objects in which give rise to sensory experiences. Much perceptual research focuses on the process
by which individuals determine the size, shape, distance, and motion of objects in the environment. But as Bruner argued, every act
of perception is an act of categorization, and the process of perception is not complete until the object has been recognized and
classified as similar to some objects and different from others.
For most of its history, the study of perception has been dominated by the constructivist/phenomenalist tradition associated with
Hermann von Helmholtz, Richard Gregory, Julian Hochberg, and Irvin Rock (among many others). The constructivist view assumes
that the proximal stimulation impinging on sensory receptors is inherently ambiguous, and that there is an infinite array of distal
configurations compatible with any momentary state of proximal stimulation. As an illustration, consider the relationship between
the size and distance of an object on the one hand, and the size of the retinal image of that object on the other. Holding distance
constant, the size of the retinal image is directly proportional to the size of the stimulus; but holding size constant, the size of the
retinal image is inversely proportional to the distance between the object and the perceiver. Thus, given the size of a retinal image,
the perceiver does not know whether s/he is viewing a large object far away or a small object close at hand.
According to the constructivist view, stimulation of this sort must be disambiguated by inference-like rules which compare the
size of the object with the size of its background, or some comparison of the stimulus input with an a priori model of the world
which tells us how large various objects are. In either case, perceiving entails thinking and problem-solving. Sometimes the solution
can be wrong, as when the perceptual system overcompensates for distance cues to generate the illusion that the moon on the
horizon is larger than the moon at zenith. Helmholtz famously argued that the inferential rules that guide perception are part of
our tacit knowledge: they can be discovered by the scientist, but cannot be articulated by the perceiver. Because the thoughts
that give rise to our percepts are unconscious, perception lacks the phenomenal quality of thought. But it remains the case that
the final product of perception is a mental representation of the stimulus world, constructed by cognitive operations such as compu-
tations and symbolic transformations. We are not aware of the world itself, but only of our mental representation of it, which is
projected onto the world so that the objects of perception and the objects of the world are co-referential. Even more than sensation,
perception from the constructivist/phenomenalist view has cognitive underpinnings which cannot be denied.
A contrary, noncognitive view of direct realism was proposed by J.J. Gibson in his ecological theory of perception (interestingly,
Neisser took a constructivist approach to perception in Cognitive Psychology, but later embraced a version of direct realism).
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According to the ecological view, stimulation is ambiguous only at very elementary levels, but there is no ambiguity at higher
levels. So, for example, in determining an object’s size, the perceptual system extracts information about the ratio of the size
of an object to the size of its background; it is this ratio which determines perceived size, not the size of the retinal image of
the object alone. Thus, the perceived size of an object remains constant even as its distance from the viewer (and thus the size
of its corresponding retinal image) varies; but this requires no computations, inferences, or a priori models of the world on
the part of the perceiver; size is effortlessly perceived directly from information available in the environment “ about the ratio
of the figure to ground, without need of any mediating cognitive operations. Because perceptual systems evolved in order to
support adaptive behavior, Gibson further proposed that we perceive objects in terms of their affordances, or the actions that
we can take with respect to them. Thus, in the same way that the ecological view of perception argues that all the information
required for perception is “in the light”, an ecological view of semantics argues that the meanings of words are “in the world”,
available to be perceived directly.
The ecological theory of perception proposes that the perception of form, distance, motion, and other stimulus properties is no
different from perceiving the hue of a light or the pitch of a sound. In each case, phenomenal experience occurs by virtue of the
transduction of stimulation into perception, accomplished in a single step by specialized neuronal structures that have evolved
to be selectively sensitive to higher-order variables of stimulation available in an organism’s environmental niche. Additional stim-
ulation is provided by the perceiver’s own body – for example, movements of the eyes in the perception of motion, or accommo-
dation of the eye in the perception of depth or distance. A famous series of experiments by Dennis Proffitt found that subjects are
more accurate when they estimate the slope of a hill with their hands rather than verbally; and subjects who are tired from jogging,
or who are wearing moderately heavy backpacks, give steeper estimates than those who are not.
Proponents of embodied cognition argue that cognitive processes are shaped by the body as well as the environment: in other
words, they are affected by the sensorimotor context in which they occur. Embodiment can be viewed as an extension of Gibsonian
ecological perception: perception occurs in a widely distributed system that includes the body and the environment as well as the
mind.
The contrast between the constructivist/phenomenalist and direct/realist views dominates much contemporary perception
research, with proponents of the ecological approach conducting clever experiments showing that percepts commonly attributed
to computations, inferences, or world-models are actually given directly by higher-order variables of stimulation. Still, it is one thing
to demonstrate that such information is available, and quite another to demonstrate that such information actually contributes to
perception. The occurrence of visual illusions, ambiguous figures, and other anomalies of perception strongly suggests that we do
not always see the world as it really is, and that the perceiver must, in Bruner’s famous phrase, go “beyond the information given” by
the environment in order to form mental representations of the world around us.
Attention
In many theories, attention is the link between perception and memory: the amount of attention devoted to an event at the time it
occurs (i.e., at encoding) is a good predictor of the likelihood that it will be consciously remembered later (i.e., at retrieval).
Early cognitive theories considered attention to be a kind of bottleneck determining whether incoming sensory information
would reach short-term memory, and thus enter into “higher-level” information processing. A major controversy in early attention
research was between early selection theories which held that preattentive processing was limited to “low-level” analyses of physical
features, and late selection theories which allowed preattentive processing to include at least some degree of “high-level” semantic
analysis. Early selection was favored by experiments showing that subjects had poor memory for information presented over the
unattended channel in dichotic listening experiments. Late selection was favored by evidence that such subjects were responsive to
the presentation of their own names over the unattended channel.
Definitive tests of early versus late selection proved hard to come by, and beginning in the 1970s the problem of attention was
reformulated by Daniel Kahneman and others in terms of mental capacity: According to capacity theories, individuals possess a fixed
amount of processing capacity, which they can deploy rather freely in the service of various cognitive activities. Various information
processing tasks, in turn, differ in terms of the amount of attentional capacity they require. Some tasks may be performed automat-
ically, without requiring any attentional capacity at all; such tasks do not interfere with each other, or with effortful tasks that do
make demands on cognitive resources. When the total attentional capacity required by effortful tasks exceeds the individual’s
capacity, they will begin to interfere with each other. Some automatic processes are innate; however, other processes, initially per-
formed effortfully, may be automatized by extensive practice. Thus, skilled readers automatically and effortlessly decode letters and
words, even while they are doing something else, while unskilled readers must expend considerable mental effort performing the
same task, at great cost to other, ongoing activities.
According to one prominent view, automatic processes are almost reflexive in nature – although the “reflexes” in nature are
mental rather than behavioral, and they are mostly acquired through extensive practice rather than innate. That is, they are inevi-
tably engaged by the appearance of certain stimuli, and once invoked proceed inevitably to their conclusion. Because their execution
consumes no attentional resources, they do not interfere with other ongoing processes, and they leave no traces of themselves in
memory. This “attention-based” notion of automaticity plays a central role in many cognitive theories, and occupies a special place
in social psychology. According to a revisionist “memory-based” view, however, automaticity has nothing to do with attention, but
depends on the way in which skill underlying task performance is represented in memory. Automatization occurs when
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performance is controlled by procedural rather than declarative knowledge representations. From either point of view, automatic
processes are strictly unconscious: we have no direct introspective awareness of them, and know them only by inference from task
performance.
Memory
Perceptual activity leaves traces in memory, freeing behavior from dominance by stimuli in the immediate present. Much early
cognitive psychology focused on a computer-inspired “multistore” model of memory that distinguished between three different
storage structures. A set of sensory registers, one for each modality, held a veridical representation of stimulus input which decayed
over a very short period of time. By virtue of attention, some subset of this information was transferred short-term memory, which
could be maintained in an active state by rehearsal. Given enough rehearsal, information in short-termmemory could be transferred
to a permanent “long-term store. The capacity of short-term memory was limited to about seven items, while the capacity of “long-
term” memory was essentially unlimited. Later, the structural distinction between short- and long-term stores was replaced by
a unitary view in which “short-term” (or “working”) memory refers to those items in memory which are actively engaged in pro-
cessing at any moment.
Terry Winograd, John Anderson, and others have distinguished between two broad forms in which knowledge is stored in long-
term memory consists of two broad forms: declarative knowledge which can be either true or false; and procedural knowledge of
how certain goals are to be accomplished. Procedural knowledge can be further classified into cognitive and motor skills, such as
one’s knowledge of arithmetic or grammar, or of how to tie one’s shoes or drive a standard-shift car. Similarly, Endel Tulving argued
that declarative knowledge can be subdivided into episodic memories of specific experiences which occurred at a particular point in
space and time, such as one’s memory for eating sushi for dinner at home last Thursday, and semantic memories that are more
generic in nature, such as one’s knowledge that sushi is a Japanese dish made of rice, vegetables, and fish. In theory, many semantic
memories are formed by abstraction from related episodic memories, and much procedural knowledge began as declarative knowl-
edge – essentially, as a list of instructions. Most research on memory has focused on episodic memories for specific events, and is
based on an analysis of memory into three stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval.
Research on episodic memory has been dominated by the “verbal learning” paradigm invented by Ebbinghaus, in which subjects
are presented with some stimulus material, usually a list of words (hence the name), strings of letters or digits, or pictures, and then
attempt to remember them after some interval of time has passed. Each list, and each item on the list, thus constitutes a specific
event, which is to be remembered at a later time. By varying the conditions of encoding (e.g., number of rehearsals), storage
(e.g., retention interval), and retrieval (e.g., free recall vs. recognition), researchers have identified a small number of principles
of human memory.
1. Elaboration: Memory is a function of the degree to which an event is related to pre-existing knowledge. Ebbinghaus’s emphasis on
the importance of repetition has been replaced by a distinction between two types of rehearsal: maintenance rehearsal, or rote
repetition, maintains an item in an active state, while elaborative rehearsal links the item to other knowledge already stored in
memory.
2. Organization: Memory is a function of the degree to which individual events are related to each other. Whereas elaborative
processing entails the “intra-item” processing of individual items, organizational processing entails “inter-item” processing of
the relations between items, yielding such phenomena as category clustering in recall.
3. Time-Dependency: As a general rule, memory diminishes as a function of the length of the retention interval. Time-dependent
forgetting from the sensory registers is mostly a function of passive decay, while forgetting from short-term memory mostly
reflects the displacement of old items by new ones. In long-term memory, forgetting can reflect failure of consolidation. Short-
term consolidation occurs within seconds of an event: its disruption leads to the anterograde amnesia a traumatic head injury;
long-term consolidation transpires over a longer period of time, and its disruption appears to be responsible for retrograde
amnesia. Under normal circumstances, however, time-dependent forgetting from long-term memory reflects retroactive or
proactive interference by competing memories, as illustrated by the paradox of knowledge: the more a subject knows about an
event, the harder it is to retrieve any particular bit of information.
4. Cue-Dependency: Memory depends on the informational value of the cues presented at the time of retrieval. Once consolidated,
memories remain permanently available in storage, but they may not be accessible on any particular attempt at retrieval. Free
recall, which presents only information about the spatiotemporal context of the to-be-remembered event, is generally least
productive; cued recall, which provides additional information (such as category membership) more so; and recognition, in
which the cue is a copy of the target, generally yields the best performance under most circumstances.
5. The relations between encoding and retrieval processes are effectively captured by a general principle of encoding specificity (also
known as transfer-appropriate processing) which states that the likelihood that an event will be remembered depends on the match
between the information processed at the time of encoding and the information available at the time of retrieval.
6. Encoding Specificity: Memory is best when the cue information processed at the time of retrieval matches the cue information
processed at the time of encoding. How an item is processed at the time of encoding determines how it will be remembered at
the time of retrieval. Recognition testing can compensate for poor encoding, and deep, elaborate encoding can compensate for
a poverty of retrieval cues. Encoding specificity is dramatically illustrated by state-dependent memory: within limits, items
encoded under the influence of a psychoactive drug are better remembered if retrieval also takes place while drugged. Similar
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effects can be induced by emotional state and environmental context. State-dependent effects are strongest, however, when
retrieval cues are relatively weak and impoverished.
7. Schematic Processing: Memory for a specific event is a function of the relationship between that event and pre-existing knowledge,
expectations, and beliefs. There is a U-shaped relationship between schema-congruence andmemory: schema-relevant events are
remembered better than schema-irrelevant ones; among schema-relevant events, schema-incongruent events are better
remembered than schema-congruent events. Schema-incongruent, surprising events receive more elaborate processing at the
time of encoding – in part, reflecting attempts to explain the discrepancy between expectations and outcomes; at the time of
retrieval, the schema provides additional cues which support retrieval of schema-relevant events.
8. Reconstruction: Memory reflects a blend of information contained in memory traces and knowledge, expectations, and beliefs
derived from other sources. Most research on humanmemory is based on the library metaphor: encoding, storing, and retrieving
a memory is analogous to purchasing, cataloging, and shelving a book, which then is looked up in a card catalog (remember
them?), taken off the shelf, and read for the information it contains. But remembering and forgetting are not simply matters of
encoding, storage, and retrieval. What we remember is shaped by our attitudes, expectations, and world-knowledge, which can
lead to a variety of memory illusions in which we remember events inaccurately – including events that did not actually happen
to us. Memories are not simply mental records of the past; instead, memories are beliefs about the past, and remembering is
more like writing a book from fragmentary notes, than it is like taking a book off the shelf and reading it.
Most research on memory has employed experimental tasks requiring conscious recollection, or the ability of subjects to recall or
recognize past events. However, Daniel Schacter has pointed out that episodic memory may also be expressed implicitly in tasks that
do not require conscious recollection in any form. For example, a subject who has recently read the word veneer will be more likely
to complete the stem ven___ with that word than with the more familiar word vendor. A great deal of experimental research shows
that such priming effects can occur regardless of whether the study word is consciously remembered; in fact, they can occur in amnesic
patients have forgotten the study session in its entirety. Similarly, amnesic patients can learn new concepts without remembering
any of the instances they have encountered, and acquire new cognitive andmotor skills while failing to remember the learning trials
themselves. Along with the concept of automaticity, the dissociations observed between explicit and implicit expressions of memory
have given new life to the notion of the psychological unconscious (for a further discussion of unconscious mental processes (see
“The Unconscious”, this volume).
The dissociations observed between explicit and implicit expressions of episodic memory, between semantic and episodic
memories, and between procedural and declarative knowledge are subject to a variety of interpretations. According to the multiple
systems view, explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) memories are served by different memory systems in the brain. The
multiple systems view, in turn, is compatible with the neuroscientific view of the brain as a collection of modules, each specialized
for a particular information-processing task. By contrast, researchers who prefer a processing view, while accepting that there is some
degree of specialization in the brain, explain these same dissociations as generated by different processes that operate in the context
of a single memory system. For example, according to one processing view, implicit memories are the product of automatic,
attention-free processes while explicit memories are the product of effortful, attention-demanding ones. In general, processing views
are compatible with computational theories of memory, which typically assume that different memory tasks require the processing
of different features of memories stored in a single memory system. One of the interesting features of the debate over explicit and
implicit memory is how little contact there has been between neuroscientific views of memory on the one hand, and computational
views on the other.
Categorization
Memory also stores conceptual knowledge about things in general, as well as representations of specific objects and events. Bruner
noted that this conceptual knowledge plays an important role in perception: in fact, every act of perception is an act of categoriza-
tion. A great deal of research in cognitive psychology has sought to understand the way in which conceptual knowledge is organized
in the mind.
According to the classical view handed down by Aristotle, concepts are represented by a list of features which are singly necessary
and jointly sufficient to define the category in question. For example, in geometry, all triangles are closed two-dimensional figures
with three sides and three angles; and a sharp boundary divides all triangles from all quadrilaterals. However, in the 1970s it became
clear that however satisfying such a definition might be philosophically, it did not reflect how concepts are represented in human
minds. When perceivers judge equilateral and right triangles to be “better” triangles than isosceles triangles, they are referring to
something other than a list of defining features. According to the classical view, all members of a category are equally good repre-
sentatives of that category. For this and other reasons, the classical view of concepts as proper sets has been replaced with a revisionist
probabilistic view of concepts as fuzzy sets. According to the fuzzy set view, features are only imperfectly correlated with category
membership, and concepts themselves are represented by prototypes (real or imagined) which possess many share many features
that are characteristic of category members. The probabilistic view permits some instances (e.g., robin) of a category (bird) to be
“better” than others (e.g., emu), even though all possess the same set of defining features. Moreover, it permits the boundaries
between categories to be somewhat blurred (is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable?).
Both the classical and the probabilistic view regard concepts as summary descriptions of category members. However, an alter-
native exemplar view holds that concepts are represented as collections of instances rather than as summary descriptions. Thus, when
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we seek to determine whether an object is a bird, we compare it to other birds we know, rather than to some abstract notion of what
a bird is. Just as there is empirical evidence allowing us to firmly reject the classical view of conceptual structure as inadequate, so
there are studies showing that objects are slotted into categories if they resemble particular instances of the category in question,
even if they do not resemble the category prototype. Perhaps novices in a domain categorize with respect to abstract prototypes,
while experts categorize with respect to specific exemplars.
Regardless of whether concepts are represented by prototypes or exemplars, categorization is a special case of similarity judg-
ment: the perceiver assigns an object to a category by matching its features to those of his or her category representation, prototype
or exemplar. There is no absolute threshold for similarity, however: categorization, like signal detection, is always a matter of
judgment.
In a sense, categorization is a special case of similarity judgment, and the most recent development in theories of concepts has
been stimulated by evidence of certain anomalies of similarity. For example, subjects judge gray clouds to be similar to black clouds
and different from white clouds, but judge gray hair to be similar to white hair but different from black hair. The brightness of the
color patches is identical; so the judgment must be based on something other than perceptual similarity, such as the perceiver’s
theory about how hair changes with age or how clouds change with the weather. According to the theory-based view of categori-
zation, concepts are not represented by lists of features or instances, and categorization does not proceed by feature matching.
Rather, concepts are represented by theories which make certain features and instances relevant, and which explains how features
and instances are related to each other; and categorization proceeds by applying the theory to the case at hand. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the theory-based view of concepts and categorization will supplant, or merely supplement, the similarity-based
view.
Learning
Behaviorism was dominated by an emphasis on learning, but cognitive psychology has not abandoned the question of how knowl-
edge is acquired. After all, while knowledge of such basic categories as time and space may be innate, most knowledge is derived
from experience. Learning, then, is the process of knowledge acquisition. In fact, some of the earliest cognitive challenges to behav-
iorism came through alternative accounts of learning. Even such basic processes as classical and instrumental conditioning are now
interpreted in terms of the organism’s developing ability to predict and control environmental events. Pavlov’s dogs did not salivate
to the bell because it occurred in close spatiotemporal contiguity with meat powder, and Skinner’s pigeons did not peck at the key
because it was reinforced by the delivery of food in the presence of a certain light. Rather, and not to anthropomorphize, they did so
because they expected food to follow the bell and the keypeck. Learning occurs in the absence of reinforcement; reinforcement
controls only performance, the organism’s display of what it has learned.
The importance of expectancies, and the limited role played by contingencies of reinforcement, is underscored by the develop-
ment of theories of social learning by Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, Walter Mischel, and others, who argued that human learning
rarely involved the direct experience of rewards and punishments. Rather, most human learning is vicarious in nature: it occurs
by precept, in the sense of sponsored teaching, or by example, as in observational modeling. In either case, we learn by watching
and listening to other people. Bandura argued that behavior was controlled not by environmental stimuli, but by expectancies con-
cerning the outcomes of events and behaviors, and also by self-efficacy expectations – that is, people’s belief that they can engage in
the behaviors that produce desired outcomes. Some clinical states of anxiety may be attributed to a (perceived) lack of predictability
in the environment, while some instances of depression may be attributed to a perceived lack of controllability. Interestingly,
a capacity for observational learning has been uncovered in nonhuman animals such as rhesus monkeys, and has been implicated
in the genesis of animal “cultures”.
Learning processes are obviously implicated in analyses of the encoding stage of memory processing, in the acquisition of proce-
dural knowledge, and in concept-formation. At the same time, cognitive psychologists have generally avoided the topic of learning
itself. Partly, this may reflect an overreaction to the excessive interest in learning on the part of behaviorists; partly, it may reflect the
influence of Chomsky, who discounted the role of learning in the development of language. Recently, this situation has changed
due to the rise of parallel distributed processing, interactive activation, neural network, or connectionistmodels as alternatives to traditional
symbolic processing models of human information processing. In symbolic models, each individual piece of knowledge is repre-
sented by a node, and discrete nodes are connected to each other to form a network of associative links. Thus, a node representing
the concept doctor is linked to semantically related nodes representing concepts such as nurse and hospital. Such models are very
powerful, but they leave open the question of how the knowledge represented by nodes is acquired in the first place. Connectionist
models assume that individual concepts are represented by a pattern of activation existing across a large network of interconnected
nodes roughly analogous to the synaptic connections among individual neurons (hence the alternative label). No individual node
corresponds to any concept; every concept is represented by a pattern of widely distributed nodes. Instead of one node activating
another one in turn, all nodes are activated in parallel, and each passes activation to each of the others. In connectionist systems,
learning occurs as the pattern of connections among nodes is adjusted (sometimes through a learning algorithm called back prop-
agation) so that stimulus inputs to the system result in the appropriate response outputs. Although the link between connectionism
and stimulus-response behaviorism is obvious, connectionist theories are cognitive theories because they are concerned with the
internal mental structures and processes that mediate between stimulus and response. Compared to traditional symbolic models,
they are extremely powerful and efficient learning devices. Unfortunately, they also display a disconcerting tendency to forget what
they have learned, as soon as they are asked to learn something new – a phenomenon known as catastrophic interference. Moreover,
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although connectionist models seem to reflect the neural substrates of learning, it has proved difficult to demonstrate the biological
plausibility of specific features such as back-propagation. Accordingly, the future of connectionist models of information processing
remains uncertain.
Language and Communication
Language is both a tool for human thought and a means of human communication. The ability of people to generate and under-
stand sentences that have never been spoken before is the hallmark of human creative intelligence, and arguably the basis for human
cultural evolution. And language permits us to convey complex information about our thoughts, feelings, and goals to other people,
and provides a highly efficient mechanism for social learning.
Language was one of the first domains in which cognitive psychology broke with behaviorism. Early cognitive approaches to
language were couched in terms of information theory, but a real breakthrough came in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the
work of Chomsky. In his early work, Chomsky distinguished between the surface structure of a sentence, viewed simply as a sequence
of words, its phrase structure in terms of noun phrases and verb phrases, and its deep structure or underlying meaning. He also argued
that transformational grammar mediated between deep structure and phrase structure. Transformational grammar is universal and
innate. Language acquisition consists of learning the specific rules which govern the formation of surface structures in a particular
language.
The field of psycholinguistics largely arose out of attempts to test Chomsky’s early views. For example, it was shown that clicks
presented while sentences were being read were displaced from their actual location to the boundaries between phrases; and that the
time it took to understand a sentence was determined by the number of transformations it employed. Nevertheless, over the ensuing
years his theory has been substantially altered by Chomsky and his colleagues, and in some quarters it has even been discarded. In
any event, it is clear that other aspects of language are important, besides grammatical syntax. Languages also have phonological
rules, which indicate what sounds are permitted and how they can be combined; and morphological rules which constrain how
new words can be formed. Moreover, research on the pragmatics of language use show how such aspects of nonverbal communi-
cation as tone of voice, gesture, facial expressions, posture, and context are employed in both the production and understanding
of language.
One major controversy in the psychology of language concerns speech perception. According to the motor theory of speech percep-
tion proposed by Alvin Liberman and his colleagues, “speech is special” in the sense that it is processed by mechanisms which are
part of a specifically human cognitive endowment; no other species has this capacity. According to a rival auditory theory of speech
perception, understanding speech is simply a special case of auditory perception, and requires no special capacities that are unique
to humans. Tests of these theories often revolve around categorical perception, or the ability to distinguish between related sounds
such as [b] and [p]. Evidence that there are sharp boundaries between such speech categories is often attributed to innate, specifically
human, mechanisms for producing speech, thus favoring the motor theory. On the other hand, evidence of categorical perception in
nonhuman species which do not have a capacity for speech favors the auditory theory.
A common theme in the Chomskian approach to language is that language use is mediated by innate rules which cannot be
acquired by general-purpose systems which learn solely by virtue of associations among environmental events. Chomsky claims
that support for the role of innate rules comes from the errors children and others language learners make in forming the past tenses
of irregular verbs: goed instead of went, or eated instead of ate. Because the children have never heard such words (the adults they
listen to don’t make them), they cannot have been acquired through experience; rather, they must be produced by a rule which
the child has abstracted in the course of learning his or her native tongue. If computers are to have a language capacity, they
must be programmed with these kinds of rules; they will never learn language without some rule-based cognitive structure. Recently,
however, connectionist models of language have been developed which have no rules of syntax, and operate solely by association-
istic principles, but which make precisely the errors that are traditionally attributed to the operation of grammatical rules. If so, the
implication may be that human language is nothing “special” after all: it is something that can be done by any associationistic
learning system which possesses sufficient computational power. Proponents of rules, in turn, have criticized these demonstrations
as misleading and unrepresentative of people’s actual language use. For example, the model makes mistakes that children do not
make, and learns by virtue of inputs that do not resemble children’s actual learning environments. Because the capacity for language
is so central to our traditional conception of what it means to be human, the debate between rules and connections is likely to be
vigorous and protracted.
Judgment, Reasoning and Problem Solving
Thinking played a prominent role in early psychology. The structuralist school of Wundt and Titchener was almost consumed by
a fruitless debate over imageless thought, while Oswald Kulpe’s act psychology attempted to attempted to characterize the process
of thinking rather than the static elements of thoughts. Like other mentalistic topics, thinking dropped out of sight with the rise
of behaviorism, but interest in the topic was preserved by Gestalt psychologists, as in Kohler’s work on problem-solving in chim-
panzees. Whereas behaviorists construed thinking as a matter of gradual trial-and-error learning, the Gestaltists emphasized sudden
insights produced by a cognitive restructuring of the problem at hand. In England, Frederick C. Bartlett argued that perception and
memory were essentially exercises in problem-solving – the problem being to construct mental representations of the present and to
reconstruct mental representations of the past. After World War II, the cognitive revolution was heralded by Bruner’s work on
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concept learning, Jean Piaget’s research on the development of thought in children, and the work of Herbert Simon and Allan New-
ell on computer simulations of human problem-solving.
Much early research on thinking was guided, at least tacitly, by a normative model of human rationality which held that people
reason according to a logical calculus, and make rational choices based on principles of optimality and utility. According to the
classical view of concept structure, for example, people categorize objects according to lists of defining features which are singly
necessary and jointly sufficient to define category membership. In classical decision theory, individuals calculate the costs and bene-
fits to themselves of various options, and then make choices that maximize their gains and minimize their losses as efficiently as
possible. Much work on reasoning was dominated by the search for algorithms: logical, systematic rules, analogous to recipes, that
specify how information should be combined to yield the correct solution to whatever problem is at hand.
Although normative rationality provided a reasonable starting point for developing theories of human reasoning and
problem solving, many human judgments must be made under conditions of uncertainty, where there is no algorithm applicable,
the information needed to apply an algorithm is unavailable. Other judgments must be made under conditions of complexity,
where there are simply too many choices available, or too many factors entering into each choice, to permit evaluation according
to some judgment algorithm. Under such conditions, people tend to rely on judgment heuristics – shortcut “rules of thumb” which
bypass normative rules of logical inference, and thus permit judgments without recourse to algorithms. One such heuristic, asso-
ciated with the work of Herbert Simon on organizational decision-making, is satisficing: instead of conducting an exhaustive
search for the optimal choice, a judge may terminate search as soon as the first satisfactory option is encountered. Prototype-
or exemplar-matching constitute heuristics for categorization: instead of consulting a list of defining features that are singly
necessarily and jointly sufficient to assign an object to some category, people compare the object at hand to a “typical” instance,
or indeed to any instance at all.
While appropriate algorithms are guaranteed to deliver the correct solution to whatever problem is at hand, use of heuristics
incurs some risk of making an error in reasoning or judgment. Analysis of common judgment errors, such as the “gambler’s fallacy”,
by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and others has documented a number of other commonly used judgment heuristics. Repre-
sentativeness permits judgments of category membership, similarity, probability, and causality to be based on the degree to which an
event resembles the population of events from which it has been drawn. Availability permits judgments of frequency and probability
to be based on the ease with which relevant examples can be brought to mind, while simulation bases judgments on the ease with
which plausible scenarios can be constructed. In anchoring and adjustment, initial estimates are taken as reasonable approximations
to the final result of some calculation.
These and other effects show that the principles of cognitive functioning cannot simply be inferred from abstract logical
considerations; rather, they must be inferred from empirical data showing how people actually perform. Research shows that
people commonly depart from the principles of normative rationality, but a further question is what we should make of these
departures. Although Aristotle defined humans as rational animals, one possible conclusion from empirical studies is that people
are fundamentally irrational: that human judgment, reasoning, choice, and problem-solving is overwhelmed by a large number
of fallacies, illusions, biases, and other shortcomings. At best, according to this argument, most people are “cognitive misers”
who use as little information, and as little cognitive effort, as possible in their lives; at worst, people are just plain stupid – inca-
pable, without extensive instruction (and perhaps not even then), of conforming themselves to the principles of logic and
rationality.
This pessimistic conclusion about human nature is a little reminiscent of Sigmund Freud’s argument, around the turn of the last
century, that human rationality is derailed by unconscious affects and drives. On the other hand, it is possible that the case for
human irrationality has been overstated. For example, the philosopher Jonathan Cohen has questioned whether the formal laws
of deductive and probabilistic reasoning are properly applied to the problems which people actually encounter in the ordinary
course of everyday living. Herbert Simon, for his part, has concluded that human rationality is bounded by limitations on human
information-processing capacity (as captured, for example, by George Miller’s famous essay on “the magical number seven, plus or
minus two”). From this perspective, it is simply unreasonable to hold humans up to an impossible standard of unbounded ratio-
nality, of a sort that might characterize a computer which has the capacity to search and calculate for as long as it takes to deliver
a “logical” result. Relatedly, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued that “fast and frugal” judgment heuristics succeed more
often than they fail because they are appropriately tuned to the structure of the environments in which people actually operate.
From this perspective, most “fallacies” in human reasoning emerge in performance on laboratory tasks that do not adequately reflect
the real world in which judgment heuristics work. On the other hand, some evolutionary psychologists have argued that judgment
heuristics are part of an “adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific cognitive devices (or modules) that evolved in the “environment of
evolutionary adaptedness” – namely, the African savanna of the Pleistocene era, roughly 1.8 million years ago – to help our
hominid ancestors solve fundamental problems of survival and reproduction.
Cognitive Development
Compared to other mammals, human beings are born with relatively immature brains; moreover, physical development continues
even after brain development has essentially completed. These facts raise the question of how the intellectual functions character-
istic of the human adult arise in the first place (and, from a life-span perspective, whether, how, and to what extent cognitive skills
are lost through aging).
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The Ontogenetic View
From an ontogenetic point of view, tracing the growth of cognition in the individual organism, cognitive development has recapit-
ulated the debate between nativism and empiricism which has dominated cognitive psychology at large. From the empiricist
perspective, the child is a tabula rasa, who acquires knowledge and skills with learning and experience. From the nativist perspective,
even neonates possess at least primitive cognitive faculties, which develop further in interaction with the environment. The tension
between nativism and empiricism can be seen clearly in the debate, discussed earlier, over whether language acquisition is mediated
by innate grammatical rules or by a general-purpose associative learning mechanism.
A new perspective on cognitive development, combining elements of both nativism and empiricism, was offered by Jean Piaget,
who proposed that children enter the world with a rudimentary set of reflex-like cognitive structures, called sensory-motor schemata,
through which the child interacts with the world. Environmental events are interpreted through prevailing cognitive schemata but
they also force these schemata to change in order to cope with an increasingly complicated stimulus environment. Through the cycle
of assimilation and accommodation, the child moves through a number of qualitatively different stages, each highlighted by
a particular cognitive achievement. The milestone marking the end of the sensory-motor stage, at about 18 months of age, is object
permanence – the ability to deal with objects that are not present in the immediate physical environment. The end of the preopera-
tional stage, at about age 7, is marked by conservation, or the ability to appreciate that quantities remain constant despite changes in
physical appearance. The transition from concrete operations to formal operations, at about age 12, is marked by the child’s ability to
comprehend abstract concepts and formal logical relations.
For Piaget, the child proceeds through these stages of cognitive growth in a strict sequence: some tasks, requiring abilities char-
acteristic of later stages, are simply impossible for a child who is still at an earlier stage. Such a proposal was bound to be challenged,
and indeed later experiments employing extremely subtle measures often showed that, as a 1993 cover story in Lifemagazine put it,
“Babies are smarter than you think”. For example, 7-month-old infants may not reach for the spot where a toy has been hidden, but
they do stare at it, indicating that they have some sense of object permanence after all. Similarly, when a mouse hidden behind
a screen is joined by a second mouse, 5-month-olds show surprise when the screen is revealed to reveal only one mouse, suggesting
that they have some ability to conserve number.
Results such as these have suggested to some theorists that infants enter the world with a surprisingly sophisticated fund of
innate knowledge about the world, which is refined and elaborated through experience. What develops, then, is expertise: the infant
starts out as a novice with respect to objects, numbers, and the like. Development proceeds with continuous increases in motor
control and information-processing capacity, and also with increased opportunities for learning through experience. Infants reach
for the hidden toy not because they have acquired object permanence, but because they have acquired the ability to coordinate their
actions with their thoughts. More recent experiments, however, indicate that infants’ appreciation of object permanence is incom-
plete. Developing children acquire new knowledge and skills, not just the ability to use innate knowledge and skills more efficiently
and effectively.
Development also entails the acquisition of metacognition: one’s knowledge of what one knows, and how one’s own mind
works, and how this knowledge can be deployed strategically in the service of adaptive behavior. Metacognitive knowledge is
sometimes characterized as a theory of mind, a phrase which recalls Piaget’s argument that children, no less than adults, function
as naïve scientists. From the first moments of life, children are constantly trying to understand themselves and the world around
them, including other people, by generating hypotheses, testing them empirically, and refining their theories accordingly. Chil-
dren do not just develop increasingly sophisticated theories of mind; they also develop increasingly sophisticated theories of
physics, chemistry, biology, and the rest of the natural world, as well as sociological and anthropological theories about groups,
organizations, societies, and cultures. The “theory” theory, as it is sometimes called, makes clear that cognitive development is
not just something that happens passively to the child by virtue of maturation, learning, and the activities of adults. Rather, the
child takes an active role in his or her own development, instigating the very interactions that promote cognitive growth through
learning.
Language, Culture, and Thought
Cognitive development can also be viewed in cultural terms. Cognitive anthropology (see below) had its origins in the efforts of
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Franz Boas, W.H. R. Rivers, and others to determine whether there were differences in the thought patterns char-
acteristic of members of “primitive” and “advanced” cultures. Some early Soviet psychologists, such as Lev Vygotsky and Alexander
Luria, attempted to trace the effects of economic development on the way people think. In view of the central role of language in
culture, considerable effort has been devoted to the question, initially raised by the American anthropologists Edward Sapir and
Benjamin Whorf, whether there are cognitive differences between speakers of different languages. This is not a matter of “develop-
ment”, per se, because all languages are equally complex: it is merely a matter of language and culture.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis takes two forms: that language determines thought or that language influences thought. The former
is a much stronger view because it states that one is incapable of understanding a concept for which the language has no name (it
also implies that there is no thought without language). There is no empirical evidence supporting the strong version and consider-
able evidence that thought can proceed without benefit of language. However, the weak version plausibly suggests that different
languages can “carve up” the world into different ways – or, put another way, that conceptual thinking can be shaped and con-
strained by available linguistic categories. As Whorf put it, “We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, ascribe significance as
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we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our language”.
There are actually two aspects to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism. Relativity refers to the
claim that speakers are required to pay attention to different aspects of the world that are grammatically marked (e.g. shape clas-
sifiers in Japanese or verb tenses to indicate time). Determinism claims that our cognitive processes are influenced by the differences
that are found in languages. The most famous example, and the most erroneous, of the Whorf hypothesis is Whorf’s observation
that Eskimos havemany words for snow, implying that because they live in a snowy environment they needed to come up with finer
distinctions for the different types of snow. But American skiers have different words for snow, too, so the example is not as remark-
able as it first may appear because expertise leads to larger vocabularies for certain domains.
In a classic test of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Paul Kay and his colleagues compared English speakers with Tarahumara speakers,
a Uto-Aztecan language of Mexico that does not have a separate color term for blue and green. In the first experiment, the subjects
were presented with a blue color chip, a green, color chip, and another color chip that was intermediate to blue and green. English
speakers sharply distinguished the intermediate color chip into either blue or green by using a naming strategy, whereas the Tara-
humara speakers chose randomly. In the second experiment, English speakers were first presented with two color chips and shown
that one (intermediate) was greener than the other color chip (blue) and then shown that the same intermediate chip was bluer than
the other color chip (green). By making the subjects call the intermediate color chip both green and blue, the bias that was demon-
strated in the first experiment went away and the English speakers performed similarly to the Tarahumara speakers. More recent
studies have gone beyond categorization to document language effects in motion perception, decision-making in economic and
health domains, and temporal orientation.
The influence of language on how we think about the events that happen in our world can be demonstrated in other experiments
other than those designed to confirm or disconfirm the Whorf hypothesis. Classic work by Leonard Carmichael and his colleagues
demonstrated that subjects had different systematic distortions in their recall of ambiguous line drawings depending upon which
verbal label they were given (e.g. dumbbells or eyeglasses). Experiments on eyewitness testimony by Elizabeth Loftus and others
showed that by varying the verb (e.g. crashed or hit) one can manipulate the estimated speed of the traveling car given by the
subjects. Whorf himself became interested in language when he noticed that behavior around gasoline drums changed when the
drums were called “empty” though they contained dangerous vapors. Because the word empty connotes “lack of hazard,” careless
behavior from the workers resulted in fires from the tossing of cigarette stubs or the smoking by the workers.
Beyond the influence of language on categories, the linguist George Lakoff’s work on metaphors offer another way of testing the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis without depending upon the idea that language carves the world into different pieces and, as he has put it,
“cultures differ only in the way they have their meat cut up”. Though some metaphors are universal (e.g. love is warmth), not all
cultures share the samemetaphors. By fleshing out the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis with the use of different sophisticated cognitive tasks
and not relying on the differences between “exotic” and “non-exotic” languages, we can further explore the ways in which the
language we speak shapes our thoughts.
The Phylogenetic View
Cognitive development can also be approached from a phylogenetic perspective, tracing the relations between the intellectual func-
tions of human and children and adults and those of other animals – especially the great apes, whose genetic endowment is so
similar to our own. There is a vigorous debate over whether chimpanzees and gorillas have anything like the human capacity
for language, but it is clear that these and other animals do have the ability to acquire symbolic representations of objects, events,
and concepts – something like semantics, if not syntax as well. Pigeons can be taught to categorize a wide variety of objects including
trees, people (and their emotional expressions), fish, flowers, and automobiles. Studies of mirror-recognition indicate that
chimpanzees possess a rudimentary concept of self, while the notion of a “theory of mind” initially arose out of observations
that chimpanzees had the ability to attribute mental states to others of their kind. Setting aside the question of whether other species
have a capacity for language, it is clear that the behavior of nonhuman animals – especially those who are closest to us in the evolu-
tionary scheme of things – is not just a matter of innate and conditioned responses; some of them, at least, have cognitive capacities
not unlike our own.
Cognition in Personality, Social, and Clinical Psychology
The cognitive revolution in psychology began with traditional experimental psychology, with a focus on learning, perception,
memory, and thinking, but it quickly spread to other areas of the field. The cognitive approach to social psychology is based on
the idea that interpersonal behavior is shaped by the actors’ perceptions of the social situation, each other, and themselves; memo-
ries of past experiences in similar situations; and decisions about what to do in the current one. Similarly, the cognitive approach to
personality assumes that individual differences in social behavior are based on individual differences in the construal (categoriza-
tion) of the social situation, as well in the declarative and procedural knowledge that each participant brings to bear on the inter-
action. Much of experimental psychopathology is concerned with psychological deficits associated with various forms of mental
illness – for example, difficulties of attention in schizophrenia. And cognitive therapy attempts to change maladaptive behavior
by altering the patients’ beliefs and expectations concerning themselves, other people, and the world around them.
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Cognition Beyond Psychology
The cognitive revolution in psychology was paralleled by the development of the field of cognitive science, whose practitioners
included philosophers, linguists, computer scientists, neuroscientists, behavioral biologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, as
well as psychologists. In some sense, the rise of cognitive science may have been a reaction to the dominance of behaviorism within
psychology: many who wished to pursue a science of mental life may have felt that they would have to go outside psychology to do
so. By the same token, it seems reasonable to hope that the combined efforts of a number of different disciplines are more likely to
yield a better understanding of cognitive processes than any one of them working in isolation.
Cognitive science has much to contribute to the understanding of human cognition, but its brief history goes beyond the human
to include the problem of intelligent machines. While some early cognitive psychologists viewed the computer to be a model of the
human mind, some early cognitive scientists believed that it offered the prospect of implementing the “mechanical mind” debated
by philosophers at least since the time of Descartes.
In the formulation of the philosopher John Searle, work on artificial intelligence (AI) takes two broad forms. In “weak” AI, the
computer provides a vehicle for writing formal theories of the mind, which can be tested by pitting the results of a computer simu-
lation against the data of actual human performance. In terms of formal precision of its theories, weak AI is cognitive psychology at
its best. By contrast, “strong” AI entails the notion that computer programs can, in principle, really think just as humans do. The
program of strong AI has its origins in the proposal, by Alan Turing, that appropriately programmed computers are capable of per-
forming any explicitly stated cognitive task: a machine would pass the Turing test if the responses a computer were indistinguishable
from those of a human being. Searle believes that the program of strong AI is seriously misguided – a position that is opposed with
equal vigor by other philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett.
More recently, research in artificial intelligence has shifted from an effort to make machines think the way humans do, to an
effort to allow machines to “think” however they are capable of doing so, regardless of how humans might accomplish the
same task. Thus, in May 1997 00Deep Blue”, a supercomputer programmed by IBM, was able to beat the world champion Gary Kas-
parov at chess, but nobody claimed that Deep Blue played chess the way Kasparov (or any other human) did. Furthermore in 2016,
AlphaGo, an AI computer program developed by Alphabet Inc.’s Google DeepMind, beat Lee Sedol, a grandmaster in Go, a complex
Chinese strategy board game, with an unconventional move never seen before in its 2500-year history. The move was described as
“not a humanmove” and in that moment, commentators and other highly skilled players did not know what to make of that move.
Indeed these non-intuitive unconventional moves in game play are called “computer moves” because these AI programs are able to
formulate moves that escape human thought. Cognitive psychology remains an important component of cognitive science. But to
the extent that it seeks to develop intelligent machines on their own terms, without reference to human intelligence, cognitive
science departs from cognitive psychology.
Cognitive science, which once was dominated by behavioral experiments and computational models, has recently reached
“down” to strengthen its connections to neuroscience. At the same time, neuroscience, which once was preoccupied with events
at the molecular and cellular levels, has reached “up” to take an interest in the organismal level of experience, thought, and action.
Both trends have been aided by the development of brain imaging techniques, such as positron emission tomography (PET), func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and magnetoencephalography (MEG), which open windows on the brain as it is
engaged in complex cognitive activities such as perceiving, remembering, imaging, and thinking. Particularly promising is the
combination of the high spatial resolution of fMRI with the high temporal resolution of MEG. Just as earlier investigators discovered
specific cortical areas specialized for vision, hearing, and the like, so a new generation of brain researchers have uncovered specific
areas activated in such activities as language comprehension, mathematical computation, analytical reasoning, and working
memory. At the same time, it has become clear that the brain is not simply a collection of task-specific modules, as suggested by
the common metaphor of a Swiss Army knife. Most cognitive activities involve large swaths of brain tissue, as information is passed
among a large number of different modules.
Brain-imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) promise to solve the ancient mind-body
problem, but they also present the danger of lapsing into a kind of high-technology revival of phrenology. In the final analysis, brain
imaging can only reveal which areas of the brain are activated when experimental subjects engage in particular tasks, such as lexical
decision and mental arithmetic. Discovering what these areas do requires a careful analysis of the experimental tasks employed in
the imaging study, and that is a matter for cognitive psychology. If researchers do not have a correct description of the components
of the task at the psychological level of analysis, they will reach erroneous conclusions concerning the cognitive functions of various
parts of the brain. Solving the mind-body problem is not just a matter of building bigger magnets, resolving the details of neuro-
chemistry, and ruling out physiological artifacts. Cognitive neuroscientists sometimes engage in a “rhetoric of constraint” which
asserts that psychological theories of mental, a structures and processes are constrained by the facts of brain anatomy and physi-
ology. But cognitive neuroscientific theories are theories of function, and describing functions is the task of psychology. Genuine
advances in cognitive neuroscience depend on continued progress in cognitive psychology, so that brain researchers can work
with tasks that are well understood.
Even within the social sciences, it is clear that cognition is not just for psychologists anymore (if it ever was). Linguistics, tradi-
tionally concerned with the discovery of linguistic regularities and the origins of words, has increasingly worked to understand
language as a tool for thought and means of sharing ideas. Economics, once concerned solely with the abstract description of
economic systems, has more recently turned its attention to individual economic decision making (and, in the process, drawing
on the insights of psychologists such as Tversky and Kahneman). For cognitive sociologists, social conventions and norms create
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a framework in which individuals think their thoughts. By the same token, cognitive anthropologists are willing to entertain (and
test) the hypothesis that cultural differences entail differences in modes of thought as well as differences in beliefs and behavior.
Sociology and anthropology have challenged the doctrines of individualism and universalism, which have traditionally dominated
psychological approaches to human thought.
Beyond Cognition: Emotion and Motivation
Cognitive psychology is about knowing, but knowing is not all the mind does. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1791), the philosopher
Immanuel Kant proposed that there are three “faculties of mind”, knowledge, feeling, and desire; each of these enters into a causal
relationship with behavior, and none is reducible to any other. If Kant is right, then cognitive psychology cannot be all there is to
psychology: the principles of cognition must be supplemented by principles of emotion and motivation. In fact, some cognitive
psychologists have argued that Kant was wrong, and that our emotional and motivational states are the byproducts of cognitive
activity. For example, prominent cognitive theories of emotion hold that our emotional states are, essentially, beliefs about our feel-
ings. Put another way, cognitive theories of emotion hold that our emotional states depend on our interpretation of environmental
events and our own behaviors. As William James famously put it: we do not run from the bear because we are afraid; we are afraid
because we run from the bear. In response, some theorists have argued that emotions are not dependent on cognitive processing,
but rather are governed by their own, independent systems. To some degree, such proposals reflect a reaction to the hegemony of the
cognitive point of view within psychology. At the same time, the question of the independence of emotion and motivation from
cognition is a legitimate one, and has given rise to a new interdisciplinary field, affective neuroscience, proceeding in parallel with
cognitive neuroscience.
Regardless of how the independence issue is resolved, it is clear that cognitive processes can influence emotions and motives.
Emotions can be induced by remembering past events, and they can be altered by construing events differently. Certain “counterfac-
tual” emotions, such as disappointment and regret, require that the person construct a mental representation of whatmight have been.
While some emotional reactions may be innate and reflex-like, others are acquired through conditioning and social learning. As noted
earlier, there is evidence that some emotional states, such as anxiety and depression, result from the perception that environmental
events are unpredictable or uncontrollable; they may disappear when such beliefs are corrected. Surgical patients’ fears can be allayed
(and the outcome of treatment improved) if their doctors carefully explain what is going to happen to them, and why it is necessary.
The ability to use cognitive processes to regulate one’s own feelings and desires is an important component of emotional intelligence.
Turning to the other side of the coin, it is clear that emotional and motivational states can have an impact on cognition. In an
important sense, the “affective revolution” in psychology was initiated by studies of the effects of mood on memory; these led
psychologists to become more interested in the nature of the moods themselves. Five such effects have been well documented:
the affective intensity effect (better memory for positive or negative events, compared to neutral events); the affective valence effect
(better memory for positive than for negative events); mood-congruent memory (better memory for material whose affective valence
matches the mood in which it is encoded or retrieved); resource allocation effects (depression impairs performance on effortful, but
not automatic, aspects of memory function); and mood-dependent memory (memory is better when there is congruence between the
emotional state present at the time of encoding, and the state present at the time of retrieval). Although clinical lore holds that
emotional trauma can render people amnesic, the overwhelming finding in both the clinical and experimental literature is that trau-
matic experiences are remembered all too well.
There is also a growing literature on the emotional effects of other cognitive processes, such as perception and judgment. Signal-
detection theory has already demonstrated that goals andmotives can percolate “down” to affect the most elementary psychological
functions. Common metaphors speak of happy people viewing the world through rose-colored glasses, and that things look dark
when we’re unhappy, and in fact mood and emotion do seem to serve as filters on perception, just as they do onmemory. Similarly,
emotions have a considerable effect on judgment and decision-making. Prospect theory, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky as an
alternative to rational choice, holds that decisions are affected by the way that choices are framed, and emotions and motives form
an important element in these frames. Happy people are more likely to take risks than unhappy ones. In his Nobel Prize acceptance
speech, Daniel Kahneman noted that because our experiences are finite, we tend to base our decisions on what we think will lead to
happy memories. Even if feelings and desires prove to be largely independent of knowledge and belief, the interest of cognitive
psychologists in our emotional and motivational lives gives eloquent testimony to the breadth of the field as it approaches its
second half-century.
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